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Xu Guangyu:Nuclear Transparency(6)
Time:2013-05-11 19:07         Author:Xu Guangyu         Source:军控协会,
.Different Modes of Military Nuclear Transparency
Nuclear states are obviously different in terms of military nuclear transparent option. There are roughly the following four modes.
.Strong nuclear transparency
During the Cold War, the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was very fierce. In order to compete for military hegemony and effective deterrence, the two sides were quite open on nuclear policy, nuclear strategy, nuclear arms, and even nuclear operations, except for the specific key technologies in nuclear weapons and means of delivery. Especially in the aspects of the number of nuclear weapons, survival ability, might, reliability, penetration force, range, and accuracy, they were not only open, but also adopted deliberate propaganda campaigns of nuclear tests and exercises, in order to build nuclear confidence against the other. At the same time, they demonstrated the ability of the nuclear umbrella to their respective allies to enhance their partners’ confidence and cohesion. It can be said that their nuclear transparency had actually become public means of bilateral strategic game. As the United States and the Soviet Union had similar statehood, strategic strength and objectives, their nuclear transparency took a strong nuclear transparent manner. The limitation is that there is no lose-win. This level of transparency was more good than harmful for them. Just as both sides with a million troops, will be competing to show the power of their own for a head start, trying to create overwhelming deterrence and win without launching a war, or at least be evenly matched with each other, in order to achieve the purpose of mutual containment.
After the end of the Cold War, Russia’s overall national strength has declined significantly, but the nuclear legacy left by the former Soviet Union is still a powerful bargaining chip in nuclear games between Russia and the United States. Bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament between the United States and Russia still control the world’s nuclear arms control and disarmament process. So their nuclear transparent mode has not essentially changed.
The strong nuclear transparency obviously plays a positive role in promoting the US-Russian bilateral nuclear disarmament process, and the bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in turn, can further promote the bilateral nuclear transparency. This kind of virtuous circle has a positive meaning for their nuclear mutual trust and nuclear safety. But as the world’s only two nuclear superpowers, if they still control more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, and require other nuclear countries with a total of only less than 10% to take the same nuclear transparency model with them, it is apparently divorced from reality, and unfair.
.Vulnerable nuclear transparency
This type of mode is the overall nuclear transparent mode generally adopted by the middle-level nuclear countries. But they are not the same at all levels. The selection of nuclear policy and nuclear strategic level are easier to obtain consistent. On the level of nuclear arms, particularly the number and deployment of nuclear weapons and key technologies, they generally refuse to be transparent.
China belongs to the middle-level nuclear countries, because China and the other four countries (UK, France, India and Pakistan) are all on one hundred-class level, considering the scale of key nuclear weapons. According to SIPRI Yearbook 2011, UK has about 225 nuclear warheads; France has about 300 nuclear warheads; India has approximately 80-100 nuclear warheads; Pakistan has approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads; China has about 240 nuclear warheads. These nuclear countries are clearly at a disadvantage position compared to the nuclear superpowers, so they are basically defensive about nuclear policy and nuclear strategy. There are two main purposes of their possession of nuclear weapons. One is to break nuclear monopoly of the nuclear superpower, to enhance the national strategic status and achieve certain strategic discourse by entering the nuclear club. The other is to enhance the defensive deterrence and nuclear counterattack capabilities so as to defend their own national interests, facing possible nuclear confrontation in the region. (军控协会)