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China Will Not Change its Nuclear Policy(2)
Time：2013-04-24 17:03         Author:Yao Yunzhu         Source:PacNet
      Second, in the section on the “Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces”, the force structure, missions and roles of the PLA Second Artillery Force are specified, stating that its nuclear component is “responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks.” This is in full conformity with China’s NFU policy.  In the section on “Defending National Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity”, the preparedness of the Second Artillery Force “in peacetime”, “under a nuclear threat”, and “under a nuclear attack” are respectively described, and the alert posture of the Second Artillery Force is also in full compliance with China’s NFU nuclear policy.  It is safe to say that the latest white paper provides more detailed information on how the PLA Second Artillery Force carries out the Nation’s NFU policy.

      In addition, former President Hu Jintao reaffirmed the NFU policy on March 27 2012, at the Nuclear Summit in Seoul. And it has been reiterated in all necessary policy documents and official statements since, the most recent being on April 22nd, at the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference when the head of the Chinese delegation Pang Sen stated: “China adheres to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances.”  There is simply no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for half a century.

      However, speculations on a possible change to the NFU policy have not been conjured up without reason.  Calls for a policy change on the official NFU pledge are repeatedly heard in the Chinese media (including social media such as weibo).  The concerns over the NFU commitment stem from two basic facts:

1) The Ballistic Missile Defense systems that the United States and its allies have deployed, or are planning to deploy, are capable of intercepting residue Chinese nuclear weapons launched for retaliation after it has already been attacked, thus potentially negating the deterrence effect of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.

2) The United States is developing a series of conventional strategic strike capabilities. Once deployed, they could have the capability to strike China’s nuclear arsenal, which, if adopted as an official doctrine, would discredit China’s NFU policy. (军控协会)