A Chinese Perspective on FMCT/FMT

Mr. Li Changhe, Vice President of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), expressed his view on the issue of negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices during his participation to the seminar entitled “Fissile Material Treaty (FMT): Possibility and prospect”, organized by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), on 20^th-22^nd March,2011 in Islamabad, Pakistan. The following is an abstract of his speech:

“These days in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament，the agenda item on the Negotiation of a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, the so-called “Cut-off treaty” or called for short as FMCT/FMT, depending on different preferences , has drawn much attention with heated debates and activities around it. This is also supposed to be the core theme of this workshop. In accordance with conference organizer’s advice, I would like to share with you some of my own perspective as a Chinese individual understanding and cognition of China’s position and opinion in this regard for reference.

In 1993, the 48th UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution (48/75L ) calling for the negotiation of a "nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The resolution called for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide assistance in examining verification arrangements.

China joined consensus for the adoption of this resolution and voted for the relevant resolutions in the subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly, in support of the establishment of Ad-Hoc Committee to negotiate the FMCT on the basis of the mandate contained in the “Shannon Report” with an expectation that the treaty would be conducive to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The above-mentioned “Shannon Report” mandate is a delicate balance between the interests and concerns of all parties and a hard-earned outcome through intensive consultations.

The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing stocks of fissile material. Hence there are differences among states over what should be the ultimate aim of the FMCT and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes. It is evident that whatever the scopes of the eventual FMCT, states that are parties to a full-scope safeguards agreement, essentially non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, will by that fact alone satisfy the requirements of the FMCT. These states have undertaken not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify the fulfillment of this undertaking. Therefore, the FMCT will substantively affect only those states that have not accepted full-scope safeguards, the nuclear-weapon states and the threshold states. (责任编辑：军控协会)