Nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State, refrain from formulating nuclear deterrence policies tailored against certain countries, avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons, and eliminate the risks of accidents on nuclear weapons.

The offensive and defensive strategic forces are inextricably linked in maintaining strategic stability. Recall the contribution of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) to maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and advancing international security, and the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability as referred to in the 13 practical steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, express grave concern over the unilateral withdrawal from the treaty by relevant country, which has undermined global strategic stability. All countries should abandon development or deployment of the global missile defense system which will undermine the global and regional strategic stability, withdraw missiles and missile defense systems deployed overseas, commit not to deploy additional weapon systems abroad that undermine strategic stability. Prevention of weaponization and arms race in outer space contributes to maintaining global strategic balance and stability. Note with concern that certain country or military political group is seeking to deploy weapons in the outer space and undermine prevention of arms race in outer space, which will damage the principle of “undiminished security for all”, further destroy global strategic stability, and is not conducive to creating a necessary international security environment for nuclear disarmament.

The State Parties to the NPT should actively support the preparatory work for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), support the work of the Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat, foster the early entry into force of that Treaty. Prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States should commit to the moratorium on nuclear testing.

Support the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a universal, unconditional, and non-discriminatory international legal instrument, so as to effectively ensure that nuclear weapons are not used or threatened to be used against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances as the highest priority. Support the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee in this regard and start substantive work as early as possible.

Reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament is the only appropriate venue for the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Support the Conference on Disarmament in initiating relevant negotiations on the basis of reaching a comprehensive and balanced program of work through consensus in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

Nuclear-weapon States should commit to adopting nuclear transparency measures and enhancing mutual trust on a voluntary basis without undermining national security. Meanwhile, transparency and confidence-building measures cannot replace nuclear disarmament. Countries participating in the so-called nuclear sharing and extended deterrence arrangements should take corresponding nuclear transparency responsibilities. (军控协会)